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Abstract
This paper analyzes the interactions between vertical integration and (wholesale)
spot, forward and retail markets in risk management. We develop an equilibrium
model that ﬁts electricity markets well. We point out that vertical integration and
forward hedging are two separate levers for demand and spot price risk diversiﬁcation.
We show that they are imperfect substitutes as to their impact on retail prices and
agents’ utility because the asymmetry between upstream and downstream segments.
While agents always use the forward market, vertical integration may not arise. In
addition, in presence of highly risk averse downstream agents, vertical integration may
be a better way to diversify risk than spot, forward and retail markets. We illustrate
our analysis with data from the French electricity market.
1 Introduction
Corporate risk management has long been viewed as a prominent motive for vertical inte-
gration 1. In particular, the (supply or demand) insurance rationale for vertical integration
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1The abundant literature that has developed in the past few decades tends to sees vertical integration
as a response to problems caused by contractual incompleteness (Williamson (1971), Grossman and Hart
(1986))), for example as ways to acquire valuable private information about the production process (Arrow
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is the one that managers cite as the most important (Bolton and Whinston, 1993). In
the 1970s, for example, oil reﬁning industries produced up to 90% of their crude oil needs
in order to avoid the signiﬁcant costs that a stop in deliveries would entail (Teece, 1976).
More generally, uncertainty in demand (Carlton (1979)), lack of market ﬂexibility and risk
aversion may all provide rationale for vertical integration (Hendrikse and Peters (1989),
Perry (1989), Emons (1996), Sekkat (2006)). Of course there are other means of managing
risk, such as operational hedging and ﬁnancial instruments that have developed tremen-
dously in the past few decades (Hull, 2003). In this paper, we examine the extent to which
the development of the ﬁnancial instruments often used for hedging purposes aﬀects the in-
centive for vertical integration and the way industry structure aﬀects the ﬁnancial markets
aforementioned and their prices. Our objective is to clarify and to quantify the eﬀects of
vertical integration and forward markets in risk management and their interactions. These
issues, which are of particular importance in commodity and energy markets and which
are subject to ongoing debate in regulatory reforms in these markets, are analyzed with a
model that ﬁts electricity markets well, and illustrated with French electricity data.
Speciﬁcally, we study retail markets, wholesale spot markets and forward markets, and
the relationship between equilibrium prices on these markets and vertical integration. To
focus on risk, we abstract from considerations related to strategic behavior or market
power, and instead we assume price-taking ﬁrms that disregard any inﬂuence they could
have on the equilibrium price or on the other agents’ decisions 2. We develop a two-date
equilibrium model of retail, (wholesale) spot and forward markets for a non-storable good.
Non-storability prevents ﬁrms from beneﬁting from yet another possibility of managing
risk, which in our model is a central feature of both vertical integration and forward
markets. At an initial date, downstream ﬁrms (or downstream subsidiaries of integrated
ﬁrms) choose the number of accounts to open, which in a market of ﬁxed size boils down
to choosing their retail market shares, and forward positions under demand (and price)
uncertainty. After uncertainty is realized, producers produce the good, sell it to retailers
on the wholesale spot market, and retailers sell the good to consumers. Since the good
(1975)), to avoid rationing (Teece (1976), Green (1986), Bolton and Whinston (1993)), to weaken rivals
(Bolton and Whinston (1993), Rey and Tirole (2006)) or as a bargaining tool with vertically-related
segments (Chemla (2003)). On vertical integration, see also, among many others, Carlton (1979), Perry
(1989), Joskow (2005), Lafontaine and Slade (2007) and Sekkat (2006).
2We also ignore other forms of vertical restraints or proﬁt sharing rules.
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is non-storable, no production can occur at the initial date to serve the market later on.
Agents have preferences over random proﬁts deﬁned by a mean-variance utility function,
which can be thought of as a reduced form of traditional motives for risk management
policy 3.
We derive the equilibrium prices and exchanged quantities on the three markets in closed
forms. We show that vertical integration and forward hedging are two mechanisms that
are substitutes in the way they achieve risk diversiﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, the reduction in
risk achieved through either means encourages ﬁrms to open more client accounts at the
initial date, thus leading to greater supply and lower retail prices after generation occurs.
Hence, their ﬁrst two eﬀects are to decrease the retail price and to enable agents with low
generation capacity to obtain larger market shares. In addition, they both tend to decrease
downstream ﬁrms’ utility when upstream ﬁrms are only partially integrated: Because of
industry-wide risk diversiﬁcation, downstream ﬁrms face lower retail prices, which reduces
their proﬁt.
We further show that they are imperfect substitute risk management mechanisms be-
cause of a signiﬁcant asymmetry between upstream and downstream segments: Retailers
have to open accounts and, hence, choose their market shares under uncertainty, while pro-
ducers choose production after demand uncertainty is revealed. Therefore, downstream
ﬁrms are more exposed to demand risk. First, vertical integration eliminates this asym-
metry while forward hedging does not. Second, vertical integration is more robust to high
risk aversion than forward markets. Third, vertical integration can also increase down-
stream ﬁrms’ utility provided that they have suﬃciently high risk aversion. Fourth, a
non-integrated economy can be a stable equilibrium whereas a situation where no agents
trade forward contracts is almost never a stable equilibrium. Finally, we prove that our
conclusions are robust to the inelasticity of demand to retail price.
3 Mean-variance utility functions are widely used in asset pricing. We do not specify the market
frictions that may prompt agents to be eager to hedge risk. In the absence of market frictions such as
taxes or bankruptcy costs, ﬁrms may be indiﬀerent about their hedging policy. See, for instance, Smith and
Stulz (1984), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) and Grinblatt and Titman (2002). This corporate risk
management literature (see also Mello and Ruckes (2007)) also sometimes relies on risk-neutral settings
with constraints or frictions in order to work with implied risk aversion, but this makes it more diﬃcult
to work with fully-ﬂedged asset price equilibria
3Apart from our contribution to the risk management features of vertical integration,
our paper is related to Allaz’s (1992) and Bessembinder and Lemmon’s (2002) equilibrium
models of forward markets. We add a retail activity to their settings, and we consider
jointly forward hedging and vertical integration as tools to manage risk. We also con-
tribute to the recent literature on risk management through market versus non-market
mechanisms. While markets enable investors to diversify easily (Doherty and Schlesinger
(2002) and they are less sensitive to moral hazard (Doherty (1997)), non-market mecha-
nisms such as reinsurance companies keep an important role. In Gibson, Habib and Ziegler
(2007), the importance of non-market mechanisms stems from excessive information gath-
ering from investors in ﬁnancial markets. In our setting, the scope for vertical integration
arises as complementary to hedging, and vertical integration is desirable because of the
asymmetry between downtream and upstream ﬁrms and because of investors’ high levels
of risk aversion.
The paper is organized as follows. We develop our setting and we present the equilibrium
problem in Section 2. We then compare two diﬀerent environments. First, in Section 3, we
examine the equilibrium and the eﬀect of vertical integration in the absence of a forward
market. In Section 4, we derive the equilibrium in the presence of the forward market and
we analyze the eﬀect of the forward market and vertical integration on both the industrial
markets and ﬁnancial markets. We then illustrate our results in Section 5 through the
French electricity market. Section 6 discusses further empirical predictions. Section 7.
Appendix A contains the proofs and Appendix B shows that our main results remain in
presence of an elastic demand curve.
2 The model
In this section we ﬁrst describe price-taking retail, (wholesale) spot and forward markets
for a non-storable good. Then, we deﬁne an equilibrium on these markets.
42.1 The markets
We consider a set P of producers that produce a homogenous, non-storable good that they
can sell to a set R of retailers. After sourcing on the wholesale markets, retailers compete
in a market for consumers whose demand D is random. Demand D is described by a
random variable on a probability space (Ω, F, P). For simplicity, we assume throughout
most of the paper that demand is inelastic. Section 5 illustrates that this assumption
is broadly consistent with electricity markets. However, Section B shows that our main
results obtain when demand is allowed to be elastic. We assume that all ﬁrms are price-
takers, i.e. all agents compete disregarding any inﬂuence they could have on equilibrium
prices, or on the other agents’ behavior 4.
For simplicity, all agents have access to wholesale markets. All agents are allowed to
trade, including speculative agents that play no role in production or retail segments.
We denote by K the set of all agents: Producers, retailers and traders. Agents are not
necessarily specialized in a single segment. Hence the subsets P and R of K are possibly
intersecting, leading to four diﬀerent types of agents:
• Upstream ﬁrms, i.e. producers who produce and sell on the wholesale markets;
• Downstream ﬁrms, i.e. retailers who buy on the wholesale markets and sell goods
to consumers;
• Integrated ﬁrms who produce, trade on the markets and deliver outputs to con-
sumers;
• Traders who speculate on all markets.
Retailers can obtain goods from three sources: Wholesale markets, production if they
are integreated ﬁrms, and forward markets where they agree to buy or sell units of good
at the next date for price q. In particular, forward markets turn out to be linear contracts.
In our setting, vertical integration can be thought of as a proﬁt-sharing scheme as
4This enables us to abstract from anti-competitive motives for vertical integration surveyed in Rey and
Tirole (2006).
5in Rey and Tirole (2006) and Chemla (2003) 5. It is also a mechanism that enables
agents to diversify industry-speciﬁc risk that will dominate other forms of mergers, and in
particular horizontal integration, in diversifying risk that channels throughout vertically-
related segments.
There are two dates:
• At t = 0, retailers open accounts and thereby commit to supply a ﬁxed number (out
of a publicly known total number) of consumers at a later date. This boils down to
allowing downstream ﬁrms to choose market shares αk ∈ [0,1], k ∈ R. In addition,
agents take forward positions fk, k ∈ K (where fk > 0 represents a purchase).
• At t = 1, demand uncertainty is revealed. Agents take positions Sk, k ∈ K, on the
wholesale spot market (where Sk > 0 denotes a purchase) and producers also choose
their generation levels Gk, k ∈ P. Since the good is non-storable, production can
only occur at that time t = 1 when the demand uncertainty is observed and in which
consumers buy the good 6.
It should be noted that our setting, in which downstream ﬁrms choose the number of
accounts that they open and thereby commit to provide clients with their future demand of
a non-durable good, ﬁts well with an electricity market. This, combined with risk aversion,
is one mechanism though which ﬁrms bear risk that they may be willing to manage that
also enables us to combine asset pricing, industrial organization and corporate ﬁnance in
our model 7.





5In these papers and many of those summarized in Rey and Tirole (2006), vertical integration arises as
a response to contractual incompleteness where output and proﬁts are diﬃcult to contract upon.
6Our results are robust to equilibrium deﬁnitions where decisions on the retail and forward markets are
not taken simultaneously.
7Speciﬁc market frictions with otherwise risk-neutral environments have also widely been and elegantly
used in the economics literature, e.g. in Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) and Mello and Ruckes (2007).
Such settings are better tailored to examine corporate ﬁnance problems without as much emphasis on
market equilibria as we put in this paper
















Agent k obtains a total payoﬀ from its activity on the retail, forward and spot markets
(net its production costs):
πk =pαkD1{k∈R} − qfk − wSk − ck (Gk)1{k∈P} .
where p, w, and q denote the retail price, the wholesale spot price and the forward price,
respectively, and ck is the cost function to producer k ∈ P. The cost function is deﬁned on
R+, it is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly convex, and it satisﬁes the Inada conditions
c0
k(0+) = 0, c0
k(+∞) = +∞ .
Non-storability imposes that the net volume of good bought, sold or produced by agent
k at t = 1 is zero:
0 = αkD1{k∈R} − fk − Sk − Gk1{k∈P} ,
This allows us to discard variable Sk and to write:
πk =(p − w)αkD1{k∈R} + (w − q)fk + (wGk − ck (Gk))1{k∈P} .
The payoﬀ has three possible ingredients: The payoﬀ to a retailer that satisﬁes demand
αkD at retail price p by sourcing on the wholesale spot market at price w; the payoﬀ to
a trader buying a volume fk on the forward market at price q and selling it on the spot
market at price w; and the proﬁt made by a producer who generates a volume Gk at cost
ck(Gk) and sells it on the spot market at price w.
7We further assume that agent k’s preferences are described by a mean-variance utility
function. The risk aversion coeﬃcient λk can also be interpreted as the cost due to frictions
that are necessary for ﬁrms to care about corporate risk management, such as bankruptcy
costs and lost tax shields (Grinblatt and Titman, 2002, Chapter 21, Smith and Stulz,
1984) 8. The utility function is denoted:9
MVλk[ξ] := E[ξ] − λkVar[ξ] .
2.2 Spot market equilibrium
We proceed by backward induction and we start our analysis by determining the spot
market equilibrium at t = 1. At that time, when they enter the spot market, agents know
the realization of demand uncertainty D, and decisions on the retail and forward markets
have already been made. The outcome turns out to be independent of any decision taken




























is the sum of the production costs over the entire upstream industry.
8Debt and non-debt tax shields can be lost when cash ﬂows are volatile (Graham, 2000, Grinblatt and
Titman, 2002, Chapter 14). In addition, although bankruptcy costs are often assumed to be a fraction of
ﬁrm value at the time of bankruptcy (Gilson, 1997), cash ﬂow volatility is a well-known determinant of
capital structure and is widely perceived as a signiﬁcant cost of debt (Titman and Wessels, 1988, Frank
and Goyal, 2007).
9Such utility functions are widely used in asset pricing (Elton and Gruber, 1995). Although MVλk
is not monotonic, which implies possibly negative equilibrium prices, it can be seen as a second order
expansion of a monotonic Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (Markowitz, 1979).
8In equilibrium upstream ﬁrms produce up to the point where the spot price equals the
marginal cost. This is consistent with both perfectly competitive markets (Green, Mas
Colell, and Whinston, 2005) and regulated industries in which prices are set at marginal
cost by the regulator (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993).
The spot market equilibrium only depends on (exogenous) demand D and is therefore
independent of any other equilibrium prior to time t = 1. This results from the non-
storability condition and the inelasticity assumption on D 10.




k − ck (G∗
k))1{k∈P} (2.6)
are exogenous random variables, the distribution of which is assumed to be known by all
agents. We can then substitute w∗ and G∗
k for variables w and Gk, and we deﬁne the








k is deﬁned in (2.6) and
Πr
k(p,αk) := (p − w∗)αkD1{k∈R}
Πt
k(q,fk) := (w∗ − q)fk .
Here, Πr
k is the net retail payoﬀ derived from supplying a retail demand by sourcing on
the spot market, and Πt
k is the net trading proﬁt earned by buying fk units of goods on
the forward market and selling them on the spot market. Finally, Π
g
k is the net generation
payoﬀ obtained by producing Gk and selling it on the spot market 11.
10 Note that this situation is diﬀerent from Allaz (1992), where the demand elasticity to spot price
implies a dependency of the spot price to forward positions and a reduction of the market power of the
producers.
11Our results obtain with elastic demand as long as the equilibrium spot market depends only on the
retail price. Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity, we carry the bulk of our analysis with inelastic demand
and we address possible generalizations in Section B.
92.3 Competitive Equilibrium
In order to deﬁne an equilibrium, we introduce the following two sets:
A :=
(













Deﬁnition 2.1. An equilibrium of the retail-forward equilibrium problem is a quadruple





MVλk [Πk (p∗,q∗,αk,fk)], ∀k ∈ K .
This deﬁnes a simultaneous competitive equilibrium on both markets. Each agent sub-
mits a supply function that speciﬁes his position on the forward market and his market
share for each price level. Each agent chooses his supply function taking prices as given.
Then, the auctioneer collects all supply functions and sets prices that ensure market clear-
ing and demand satisfaction 12.
3 Analysis in the absence of a forward market
In this section, we focus on equilibria in the absence of a forward market. We derive the
equilibrium and we analyse the results. In the absence of a forward market, we deﬁne the
proﬁt function without a forward position:
Π0




In this simpliﬁed setting, Deﬁnition 2.1 reduces to:
Deﬁnition 3.1. An equilibrium of the retail equilibrium problem is a pair









, ∀k ∈ K .
12Our results are robust to alternative deﬁnitions that allow for sequentiality between investment and
forward and retail markets.










be the aggregate generation proﬁt realized by all integrated ﬁrms, i.e. the ﬁrms that run






k) = (p∗ − w∗)D
















the aggregate risk aversion coeﬃcients for the set of all agents and for the set of all retailers,
respectively. Parameter λ−1
k corresponds to Agent k’s risk tolerance, as deﬁned in Gollier
(2004) 13. We only focus on interior equilibria, i.e. equilibria where constraints α∗ ∈ [0,1]
and p∗ ≥ 0 are not binding, by discarding cases where some retailers in R have zero market
shares. The equilibrium is then characterized by the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.1. (p∗, α∗) ∈ R∗
+ × int(A) deﬁnes an equilibrium of the retail problem


















and p∗ solves the second order polynomial equation:
0 = E[(p∗ − w∗)D] − 2ΛRCov[(p∗ − w∗)D,(p∗ − w∗)D + Π
g
I] . (3.3)
Proof. See Appendix A 2
Intuitively, ﬁrm k chooses its market share in order to maximize its expected return while
keeping variance as low as possible. In other words, the market shares have a home-made
risk-management feature. Firm k’s market share increases with its risk tolerance relative to
that of the retail market and with the covariance between the aggregate generation proﬁt
13We follow in this Wilson (1979), where an aggregate risk tolerance is deﬁned by summing over the risk
tolerances of the syndicate members, as in (3.1).
11realized by integrated ﬁrms and the aggregate retail proﬁt relative to the variance of the
aggregate retail proﬁt, but it decreases with the covariance between ﬁrm k’s generation
proﬁt and the aggregate retail proﬁt relative to the variance of the aggregate proﬁt. This
is because the lower that covariance, the greater the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts that ﬁrm k
obtains through production. Hence, ﬁrm k can increase its expected proﬁt through an
increase in its market share without increasing risk much.
3.2 The retail price
We now examine retail price properties. From Equation (3.3), neither existence nor unique-
ness is granted 14. We argue that, if there exist two solutions, only one is relevant.





Since w∗ = C0(D) is a non-decreasing function of D, w∗ and D are positively correlated,
and the risk neutral retail price is greater than the expected spot price: p0 ≥ E[w∗].
When all retailers are risk-averse, we expect the equilibrium retail price to tend to the
risk neutral price when the risk aversion coeﬃcient of at least one retailer tends to zero.
This leads to the following result
Proposition 3.2. Only one equilibrium retail price can be economically relevant.
Proof. See Appendix A 2
We now examine the impact of vertical integration on the equilibrium retail price.
Proposition 3.3. When Πr and Π
g
I are negatively correlated, the presence of integrated
producers decreases the retail price.
Proof. See Appendix A 2
The correlation between Πr and Π
g
I tends to be negative. Since w∗ = C0(D), proﬁt Π
g
k
is an increasing function of D. In contrast, the retail proﬁt Πr = (p∗ − w∗)D is likely to
14 This is a common feature in such mean-variance settings.
12be a decreasing function of D: Since p∗ is ﬁxed while w∗ increases with D, Πr will likely
decrease with D. It should be noted that the higher the slope of C, the more negative we
expect this correlation, and the more powerful the eﬀect of vertical integration on retail
prices. In the numerical application in Section 5, this correlation is indeed negative.
Intuitively, vertical integration by at least one ﬁrm leads to a decrease in the retail
price because it facilitates risk diversiﬁcation between the upstream segment and the
downstream segment. Hence, ﬁrms can charge a retail price that is lower than in the
absence of vertical integration, which their price-taking behavior will prompt them to do.
3.3 Market shares
We turn to the properties of market shares. First, note that when there are some risk-








while the remaining demand is split among the risk neutral retailers. In particular, a risk
averse retailer who has no generation unit ends up with a zero market share.
Notice that, in order to satisfy the non-negativity condition of the market shares, equa-
tion (3.5) implies Cov[Πr,Π
g
k] ≤ 0. This provides us with yet another justiﬁcation for the
assumption required for vertical integration to have a negative eﬀect on the retail price.
In the absence of integrated producers and risk-neutral suppliers, the equilibrium market






The market shares are distributed proportionally to the risk tolerances, and only depend
on these parameters.
Proposition 3.4. When Πr is negatively correlated with Π
g
I, vertical integration prompts
a retailer to increase its market share.
































The downstream ﬁrms see their market shares decrease while the integrated agents increase
theirs. Indeed, the latter will decrease their risk by increasing their investment in the retail
market. In addition, although the market shares are diﬀerent from the previous case, the









4 Analysis with a forward market
We now examine the setting in the presence of a forward market. We ﬁrst characterize
the equilibria. Then, we analyse retail and forward prices and positions.







k) = p∗D − C(D) ,
be the aggregate proﬁt to both the upstream and the upstream segment, which coincides
with the social surplus in our setting.
We still focus on interior equilibria, when the constraints are not binding. The equilib-
rium with a forward market is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. (p∗, q∗, α∗, f∗) ∈ R∗
+ ×R∗
+ ×int(A)×F deﬁnes an equilibrium of the





















































q∗ = E[w∗] − 2ΛCov[w∗,p∗D − C(D)] , (4.3)
14and p∗ is a root of the second order polynomial equation

















∆ := Var[w∗]Var[Πr] − Cov2[w∗,Πr] . (4.5)
Proof. See Appendix A. 2
4.2 The forward price
From 4.3, the forward price equals the expected spot price corrected by a risk premium
term that accounts for the correlation between the spot price and the aggregate proﬁt Πe,
and the market aggregate risk aversion.15
We can rewrite q∗ as:
q∗ = E[Zw∗] with Z := 1 − 2Λ(Πe − E[Πe]) .
If Λ is suﬃciently small to ensure that Z is always strictly positive, Z deﬁnes a change in
probability and q∗ is given by the expected w∗ under a risk-neutral probability.
The forward price only depends on retail and spot prices. It is independent of the
distribution of market shares and of that of generation assets. Moreover, the risk-neutral
forward price, i.e. the price if some traders are risk neutral, boils down to the expected
spot price q0 = E[w∗].
When the cost functions are quadratic, e.g. ck(x) := 1
2x(akx+bk), ak,bk > 0, q∗ can be
written:
q∗ = E[w∗] −
2Λ
a









k , as in Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002).
The forward price increases with spot price skewness and, in the case where the retail
price is higher than the expected spot price, the forward price decreases with spot price
15 This equation has a form that is similar to that of other equilibrium models in a mean-variance setting,
as shown in Allaz (1992).
15volatility. This shows that, in the case of electricity, where spot price volatility is high,
forward prices that are lower than the expected spot price are common. Nevertheless,
forward prices that are greater than the expected spot price can occur when spot price
skewness is large and positive, i.e. when large upward peaks are possible.
In addition, the forward market equilibrium leads to the following relationship between








In particular, higher forward prices correspond to lower retail prices and conversely.
4.3 The retail price
In the presence of a forward market, the equation for p∗ is similar to that found in the














This term corresponding to the hedging property of the forward market.
As in Section 3, the risk neutral retail price boils down to p0 =
E[w∗D]
E[D] . This is not
surprising since in that case risk management is irrelevant. We can still write the Taylor
expansion around ΛR = 0 and show that only one root for p∗ is relevant, ensuring the
uniqueness of the equilibrium retail price.
We can also exhibit the following properties of equilibrium retail prices:
• The price in a fully integrated economy. If all producers are integrated, i.e.
P ⊂ R, we obtain:









Cov[w∗,p∗D − C(D)] .
In particular, in the absence of non-integrated traders, R = K and Λ = ΛR, so that
the above equation boils down to (3.3), i.e. the forward market has no impact on
the retail price.
16To see this, consider the following example: Suppose there are only N integrated






k = 0 for all k. The agents do not take any
position on the forward market. The retail price should therefore not be aﬀected.
This result highlights the substitution eﬀect between forward hedging and vertical
integration. When the industry can diversify demand risk through vertical integra-
tion, forward hedging becomes irrelevant. Conversely, Subsection 5.2.3 illustrates
that in the presence of forward hedging, vertical integration has little impact on the
retail price.
• The eﬀect of forward trading. In a partially integrated economy, p∗
F ≤ p∗
NF, i.e.
















In particular, this is veriﬁed if no producer is integrated and the retail income without
a forward market is negatively correlated to the spot price. This is also veriﬁed if
no retailer is integrated and Λ = 0 (e.g. if there is a risk-neutral trader).
In Subsection 5.2, forward hedging will be shown to reduce the retail price, but this
eﬀect decreases with the degree of integration in the industry.
• The eﬀect of integration. Let p∗
NI be the equilibrium retail price in the absence
of integration. In order to compare this price with the equilibrium retail price in the
presence of integrated ﬁrms, we substitute p∗
NI for p∗ in the right hand side of (4.4)





























which is always positive, so that the right side of (4.4) is positive for p∗
NI, i.e. partial
vertical integration reduces the equilibrium retail price.
17We will see in Subsection 5.3 that the presence of vertically integrated producers
always reduces the retail price. This eﬀect is nonetheless drastically reduced in
comparison to the case without a forward market.
We summarize our main results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.2. The forward market and partial vertical integration reduce the retail
price if and only if 4.7 is satisﬁed and the sign of 4.8 is positive, respectively.
4.4 Positions on the forward market
Equation 4.1 shows that in contrast to the forward price, forward positions depend on
both p∗ and α∗. Agent k’s forward position has three components. The ﬁrst term, i.e.
the fraction Λ
λk of a constant term that involves the correlation between the global proﬁt
and the spot price, can thus be interpreted as the trading component.16 The second term,
i.e. the fraction α∗
k of the correlation between the global retail proﬁt and the spot price is
the retail component. If the retail market revenue is negatively correlated with the spot
price, as we argued in the previous section, then retailers will take long positions on the
forward market to hedge against high spot prices. Finally, the last term corresponds to
the generation component, which takes the form of the correlation between the generation
payoﬀ and the spot price. As generation proﬁts are positively correlated to the spot price,
producers will take short forward positions to hedge against low spot prices.
4.5 Positions on the retail market






I for all k ∈ R,
the market shares become α∗
k = ΛR
λk , as in a non-integrated economy without a forward
market. This obtains, for instance, when there are no integrated ﬁrms, or all producers are

















































is retailer k’s risk neutral market share. This enables us to analyse the deviation of market
shares from the risk neutral equilibrium.
In Section 5, we will observe two important characteristics of market shares. First, the
presence of a forward market is a means for downstream ﬁrms to obtain larger market
shares in the downstream segment. Second, the higher the level of integration of an
integrated producer, the higher its market share.
4.6 Utility functions and the strong asymmetry between downstream
and upstream
The asymmetry relative to risk between retailers and producersis due to several diﬀerences.
First, in the absence of a forward market and vertical integration, retailers have to make
market share decisions under uncertainty, while producers know the realization of demand
when production takes place. Second, if ﬁnal demand is inelastic to the retail price,
upstream proﬁts are independent of the retail price, while downstream revenues depend
on both retail and spot prices. This asymmetry is central to our analysis.17
Hence, an upstream ﬁrm always beneﬁts from trading forward contracts. Since, in our
setting, the generation proﬁt Π
g
k boils down to an exogenous random variable, when an
upstream ﬁrm chooses ¯ fk(q) = 0 for all forward price q, it is guaranteed to receive a utility
MVλk[Π
g
k], i.e. the utility in the absence of a forward market. Hence, the presence of a
forward market always increases the utility to upstream ﬁrms because the strategy ¯ f = 0
is admissible and yields the same utility as in the absence of a forward market.
In contrast, downstream ﬁrms do not necessarily obtain a higher utility when forward
contracts become available. Indeed, the retail proﬁt Πr
k depends on p∗, and thus on the
other agents’ decisions. If the retail price p∗ in the presence of forward trading is diﬀerent
from the retail price without forward trading, agent k’s retail proﬁt will also be diﬀerent.
17One illustration of this asymmetry is the Californian electricity crisis, in which retailers suﬀered large
losses while producers could take advantage of high spot prices.
19Not taking a position on the forward market will not guarantee agent k to obtain the same
utility as in the absence of a forward market.
Proposition 4.3. Forward markets beneﬁts upstream ﬁrms, but not necessarily down-
stream ﬁrms, even though downstream ﬁrms beneﬁt from trading forward contracts.
In Subsection 5.2, the availability of forward contracts decreases the utility to down-
stream ﬁrms. When forward markets are available, each retailer is individually better
oﬀ taking positions on them. Hence, all retailers trade forward contracts and they can
oﬀer lower retail prices. Nevertheless, the decrease in expected proﬁts oﬀsets that in vari-
ance and this risk hedging mechanism implies a decrease in utility in comparison to the
environment without forward contracts.
The eﬀect of vertical integration on the agents’ utility depends on the utility of vertically
integrated ﬁrm. It turns out that our results are robust to various ways of handling this
problem, in particular Wilson’s (1979) approach to sum the risk tolerance of the integrated
ﬁrms or an approach that would assume that all risk aversion coeﬃcients, including those
to vertically integrated ﬁrms, are equal.18 In Subsection 5.3, we observe that, like forward
hedging, vertical integration decreases the agents’ utility because of its negative eﬀect on
retail prices. Nevertheless, for large risk aversion coeﬃcients this eﬀect can be reversed
and the gain from risk diversiﬁcation through vertical integration can be higher than the
loss in expected proﬁt.
5 Application to the electricity industry
We illustrate our analysis with data from the French electricity market. Electricity is a
non-storable good with broadly inelastic demand and price-taking ﬁrms, so this industry
ﬁts our theoretical setting well. This market is characterized by the presence of a regulated
dominant agent and recently entered competitors.
18If we were to model the integration stage rather than focusing on the market structure, the change
in utilities due to integration would also depend on the takeover game (see Tirole, 2006, Chapter 11, and
Grinblatt and Titman, 2002, Chapter 20).
205.1 Methodology
We compute the retail and forward equilibria using data from the French electricity market.
Only spot prices and demand levels are publicly available. To estimate C, we invert the
spot price w∗ = C0(D). Demand and spot price hourly data from December 2004 to March
2005 are available on web sites www.rte-france.com and www.powernext.fr. They provide
us with reliable estimates for D and w∗.
This winter was generally mild, but it was followed by a cold wave in March. The
recordings are shown on Figure 5.1-left. The circles correspond to values in March. These
are indicative of high market volatility. Nonetheless they remain strongly heterogeneous
since many generation units were unavailable during the March cold wave and that likely
had an impact on the generation costs. To address this heterogeneity, we have added a
constant to the demand sample in March 2005. We have then regressed function C so that
P∗ = C0(D) (Figure 5.1-right). The data for D and P∗, the risk aversion coeﬃcients and
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Figure 5.1: Demand and spot price samples (left). Processed and interpolated data (right).
the regressed cost function C enable us to compute the equilibrium.
Without loss of generality, the analysis can be performed with two agents. Indeed,
equations (4.1) and (4.2) are linear in λ−1
k and Π
g
k while (4.4) and (4.3) only involve the
aggregate risk aversion coeﬃcients Λ and ΛR.
215.2 The eﬀect of the forward market
In this section, we compare the equilibria with and without a forward market under
diﬀerent environments. We consider two agents in the following scenarios:
1. Agent 1 is an integrated producer that competes with a downstream ﬁrm
2. Agent 1 in an upstream ﬁrm, while Agent 2 is a downstream ﬁrm
3. Agent 1 is integrated and competes with an upstream ﬁrm
4. Agent 1 and Agent 2 are both integrated.
5.2.1 Unbundling of the retail activity
An integrated ﬁrm competes with a downstream ﬁrm. We examine whether or not retail
competition with an integrated monopolist is viable.
In the absence of a forward market, the downstream ﬁrm has to buy input from the
integrated producer on the spot market. Figure 5.2-left shows Agent 1’s market share as
a function of both agents’ risk aversion coeﬃcients. Agent 2 is limited to a very small
market share, less than 2%, for any risk aversion coeﬃcient. Agent 2 is subject to high




























































Figure 5.2: Agent 1’s market share without (left) and with (right) the forward market as
functions of the logarithm of risk aversion coeﬃcients.
possibilities to enter the retail market, all the more limited as its risk aversion is large.
Figure 5.2-right shows Agent 1’s market share with a forward market. Dotted mesh
regions represent zones where there is no equilibrium (q∗ < 0). In contrast to the previous
22case, if Agent 2 is less risk averse than Agent 1, then it can enter the retail market and
obtain a larger market share, up to 40%. The retail price remains unchanged, as shown on






























































Figure 5.3: Retail price without (left) and with (right) the forward market as functions of
the logarithm of risk aversion coeﬃcients.
Figure 5.3. This is because all producers are integrated (see Section 4.3). The upstream
risk is already diversiﬁed via the producers integrated structure.
The forward market changes the risk allocation between retailers but it does not enhance
risk diversiﬁcation. When both agents are highly risk averse, they do not agree on ex-
changing forward contracts: There is no forward market equilibrium (dotted mesh zones in
Figure 5.4). When the equilibrium exists, the forward price is almost always greater than
the expected spot price (E[P∗] = 37.9518), at least for suﬃciently low risk aversion coeﬃ-
cients. Agent 2’s forward position is in the range of its expected demand: f2 ' 1.1α2E[D].
Agent 2 hedges its retail demand by 10% above the expected demand, whatever its risk
aversion coeﬃcient. That is, the integrated producer is better oﬀ being short even if it
has to buy back part of the previously sold volumes on the spot market. Finally, Figure
5.5 shows that the forward market increases both agents utilities. This ﬁgure shows the
gain in the agents utility ∆U = UF − UNF due to the forward market. For convenience,
we plotted the monotonic transform φ(∆U), where φ(x) := sgn(x)log(1 + |x|), in order
to show both the logarithm of ∆U and its sign. Both agents beneﬁt from the forward
market.
For a better understanding of the eﬀect of forward hedging, Table 1 reports the relative
gains in utility, average proﬁt and variance (”Risk”) with λ1 = λ2 = 10−6. We also





































































Figure 5.4: Agent 1’s forward position (left) and forward price as functions of the logarithm
























































Figure 5.5: Increase in utility for Agent 1 (left) and Agent 2 (right) as functions of the
logarithm of risk aversion coeﬃcients.
and a performance measure, namely the ratio “expected proﬁt over risk”. It appears that
forward trading has a higher eﬀect on Agent 2’s utility than on Agent 1’s. Agent 1 uses
forward contracts mostly for hedging purposes, thus reducing the variance of its proﬁts by
59 %. The relative loss in average proﬁt associated to this hedging position is low, 0.67
times smaller than the decrease in the variance, resulting in a slight increase in utility.
In contrast, Agent 2 increases both risk and its average proﬁt by 793 %. The increase in
average proﬁt is twice the increase in risk, so its utility also increases. Forward trading
has a higher eﬀect on Agent 2’s business. Nevertheless, the ratio expected gain over risk
increases more for Agent 1 than for Agent 2.
24Agent 1 Agent 2
Utility: ∆U
|U| 8.8 10−2 % 793 %
Av. Proﬁt: ∆E
|E| −0.17 % 793 %
Risk: ∆Var
Var −59 % 793 %
Proﬁt vs. Risk: ∆E
λ∆Var 0.67 2
Performance: λVar
|E| × ∆ E
λVar 146 % ≈ 0
Table 1: The impact of forward trading on utility, proﬁt and risk, when λ1 = λ2 = 10−6.
5.2.2 Full unbundling
In this section, the generation activity is separated from the retail activity. Agent 1 is an
upstream ﬁrm while Agent 2 is a downstream ﬁrm. In an unbundled economy, we proved
that the forward market has no impact on the market shares, which only depend on the
risk aversion coeﬃcients (cf. Section 4.5). Nonetheless, the forward market aﬀects the
retail price. Figure 5.6 shows the retail price as a function of the risk aversion coeﬃcients
without (left) and with (right) the forward market (For the sake of clarity the zones with
no-equilibrium are omitted). If Agent 2 is too risk-averse, there is no equilibrium even
with the forward market. This is an illustration of the asymmetry between retailers and
producers. Retail might not be sustainable in this model, whereas generation always is.
In addition, the forward market decreases the retail price.






























































Figure 5.6: Retail price without (left) and with (right) the forward market as functions of
the logarithm of risk aversion coeﬃcients.
25Figure 5.7 shows the logarithmic transform of the gain in utility (φ(∆U)) due to the
forward market for both agents. The forward market increases the upstream’s utility,
while it decreases the downstream ﬁrm’s, unlike the integrated economy in Section 5.2.1.
As argued in Section 4, the admissibility of strategy fk = 0 ensures that the forward
market increases the upstream ﬁrms’ utility. While strategy fk = 0 is also admissible for
downstream ﬁrms, it is not proﬁtable if the other retailers do trade forward contracts.
The forward market does not necessarily increase their utility.
Once partially hedged on the forward market, the downstream ﬁrms can oﬀer lower
retail prices. In the meantime, market shares depend on risk tolerances, but not on the
forward market.
The gain from hedging is half the expected loss on the retail market that is induced by
the decrease in the retail price: UF
2 −UNF
2 ' 1
2(pF −pNF)E[D]. This explains the decrease
























































Figure 5.7: Gain in utility due to the forward market for Agents 1 and 2, as functions of
the logarithm of risk aversion coeﬃcients.
some indicators of risk and proﬁt as in the previous subsection. The results are shown in
Table 2. Agent 1 can now both increase its average proﬁt by 0.88 % and decrease its risk
by 99 %, hence increasing its utility by 326 %. In the meantime, Agent 2 decreases its
risk, average proﬁt and utility by 98 %, the decrease in average proﬁt being twice the risk
reduction, as above.
26Agent 1 Agent 2
Utility: ∆U
|U| 326 % −97 %
Av. Proﬁt: ∆E
|E| 0.88 % −97 %
Risk: ∆Var
Var −99 % −97 %
Proﬁt vs. Risk: ∆E
λ∆Var −0.62 % 2
Performance: ∆ E
λVar 117.63 ≈ 0
Table 2: The impact of forward trading on utility, proﬁt and risk, when λ1 = λ2 = 10−6.
5.2.3 Unbundling of the generation activity
Here, generation assets are split between integrated (Agent 1) and upstream (Agent 2)
ﬁrms.
In addition to the risk aversion coeﬃcients set at λ1 = λ2 = 10−6, we need to specify
the distribution of generation assets between the agents. We choose three diﬀerent meth-
ods when allocating the distribution of generation assets between the two agents, each
parameterized by a coeﬃcient 0 ≤ x ≤ 100. Method 1 allocates the ﬁrst x% of generation
capacity with the lowest marginal cost to Agent 1. Method 2 allocates the ﬁrst x% of gen-
eration capacity with the highest marginal cost to Agent 1. In Method 3, the allocation is
more ”balanced”: Agent 1 obtains the ﬁrst x/2% of generation capacity with the lowest
marginal cost and the ﬁrst x/2% with the highest marginal cost.
When Agent 1 has no generation capacity, we are back to the previous subsection. In
this setting, the retail price decreases with Agent 1’s total capacity (see Figure 5.8) in
both cases, with and without a forward market. It is thus minimal when Agent 1 owns all
the generation assets. Nonetheless, with the forward market, the eﬀect on the retail price
is low. Unbundling the generation monopoly increases the retail price. In addition, the
forward market has a major eﬀect on the retail price, which decreases by up to 20%.
As in paragraph 5.2.2, the forward market always increases Agent 2s utility, while it
always decreases that of Agent 1, the integrated ﬁrm (Figure 5.9). The magnitude of this
decrease is nonetheless reduced with integration. Upstream ﬁrms prompt downstream
ﬁrms to trade forward contracts and to decrease the retail price, thereby decreasing their























































Figure 5.8: Retail price for λ1 = λ2 = 10−6, without (left) and with (right) a forward
market, as a function of Agent 1’s proportion of total capacity.
utility.






































Figure 5.9: Gain in utility for Agent 1 and Agent 2 due to the forward market, as a
function of Agent 1’s proportion of total capacity.
We now let the risk aversion coeﬃcients vary for a given distribution of generation assets.
In the absence of a forward market, Figure 5.10 presents Agent 1 with 70 % of generation
capacity on the left, and 60 % on the right. Comparing with Figure 5.6, an equilibrium
always exists if the level of integration of Agent 1, i.e. its proportion of total capacity, is
high enough. This proves that vertical integration can induce better risk diversiﬁcation
than forward trading when retailers are highly risk averse. Vertical integration is more
robust to high risk aversion.






























































Figure 5.10: Retail price without a forward market, when Agent 1 owns 70 % (left) and
60 % (right) of production capacity, as a function of risk aversion coeﬃcients.
5.2.4 Competition between integrated producers
In a fully integrated market structure, the retail price is aﬀected neither by the forward
market nor by the distribution of the generation capacity. As before, we start by setting
the risk aversion coeﬃcients λ1 = λ2 = 10−6, and we let the distribution of generation
assets vary. As in paragraph 5.2.1, Figure 5.11 shows that the forward market enhances














































Figure 5.11: Agent 1’s market share without (left) and with (right) the forward market,
for λ1 = λ2 = 10−6, as a function of Agent 1’s proportion of total capacity.
the ability of an agent that owns little generation capacity to take a signiﬁcant position
on the retail market. Both agents utilities increase with the total capacity, both with and
without a forward market, as Figure 5.12-left shows. Agents are symmetric, and they
have the same behavior. In addition, the forward market increases both agents’ utility
(see Figure 5.12-right), although the increase is very small (in the range of 0.1%).
















































Figure 5.12: Utility without the forward market (left) and gain in utility due to the forward
market (right) for Agent 1 with λ1 = λ2 = 10−6 .
5.3 The eﬀect of vertical integration
We focus on the eﬀect of vertical structure on the agents’ utility. 19
5.3.1 Methodology
We consider two downstream ﬁrms R1, R2, and two upstream ﬁrms P1, P2. We assume
that R1 and P1 decide to merge, hereby creating an integrated producer I1. Then we allow
R2 and P2 to merge, thereby creating another integrated producer I2. We assume that
R1, R2, P1 and P2 have the same risk aversion coeﬃcient λ.20
In order to evaluate the beneﬁt that agents R1 and P1 would obtain if they merge, we
compare the utility MVλ[ΠI1] of the resulting entity to the utility MVλ[ΠR1 +Πw1] to R1
and P1. We refer to Agent 1 as either the pair R1, P1 or I1 if integration took place.
19Results concerning retail prices and market shares are similar to those of the previous section and
conﬁrm our conclusions. They are available upon request.
20Integrated structures’ risk aversion coeﬃcient may depend on the synergies resulting from the merger,
the cost reductions, the risk management policy in the new structure, etc. Without a forward market, the
producers risk aversion coeﬃcients do not aﬀect the equilibrium. Hence, it seems reasonable to attribute
a coeﬃcient λ to I1 and I2. This is no longer the case with the forward market, and the linearity of the
equilibrium suggests that risk tolerances should be summed among agents of the same type. Nonetheless,
when aggregating agents of diﬀerent types, this argument is not clear. In the absence of a clear-cut answer,
we choose to apply the same rule as in the absence of a forward market and attribute a coeﬃcient λ to
I1 and I2. This is consistent with the idea that ﬁrms face the same frictions, e.g. the same tax code and
bankruptcy costs.
305.3.2 Vertical integration without and with a forward market
Figure 5.13 shows that when there is no forward market a ﬁrm is worse oﬀ being integrated,
whatever the type of its competitors, when λ = 10−6. As with forward hedging, vertical
integration induces a decrease in the retail price that reduces the expected proﬁt more than
the decrease in the variance. Since there is no eﬀect that prompts the agents to vertically
integrate although they suﬀer a decrease in utility, the equilibrium is unbundling. The
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Figure 5.13: Agent 1’s (left) and Agent 2’s (right) utilities without a forward market, as
functions of Agent 1’s proportion of total capacity.
great diﬀerence between vertical integration and forward trading is that vertical integration
can increase utility when agents are highly risk averse.
The same computation as in Figure 5.13 with a risk aversion coeﬃcient λ = 10−5.1 is
depicted in Figure 5.14. If R1 owns enough generation capacity, then I1’s utility when
facing R2 + P2 is higher than that of R1 + P1. Hence, there is an incentive for vertical
integration when other agents are non-integrated. Similarly, Figure 5.14-right shows that
I2’s utility when facing I1 is higher than that of R2+P2, which confers I2 with an incentive
for vertical integration when competing with integrated agents. The equilibrium is then
full-integration.
In the presence of a forward market, when the risk aversion coeﬃcients equal λ = 10−6,
the eﬀect of vertical integration is drastically reduced (Figure 5.15). Integrating has almost
no eﬀect on utility. In addition, even for a larger risk aversion coeﬃcient (ex: λ = 10−5.1),
the forward market reduces the incentive for vertical integration.
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Figure 5.14: Agent 1’s (left) and Agent 2’s (right) utility without a forward market, as
functions of Agent 1’s proportion of total capacity.












6 Utility Actor 1


































6 Utility Actor 2






















Figure 5.15: Agent 1’s (left) and Agent 2’s (right) utilities with a forward market, as
functions of Agent 1’s proportion of total capacity.
6 Further Empirical Predictions
We have shown and illustrated that forward markets reduce the prevalence of vertical
integration in an electricity market. Speciﬁcally, forward markets enable retailers that
have no generation capacity to grab a signiﬁcant market share. Furthermore, both vertical
integration and forward markets are risk-management mechanisms that lead to a decrease
in retail prices.
More generally, our analysis predicts that there is a negative relationship between the
development of forward markets and ﬁrms’ incentives to merge with vertically related
segments. Other things equal, we expect the prevalence of vertical integration to be
higher in industries that are more subject to uncertainty and where other risk management
mechanisms are less readily available. In particular, we expect that this would be the case
32when hedging markets are less readily available.
This should also be true in industries where goods are non storable or where storage
costs are higher. Since, when goods are durable, production timing can be adjusted so as
to manage risk, forward markets and vertical integration should be less important than in
industries that have non-durable goods.
In addition, be there developed forward markets or not, we expect vertical integration
to be more widespread in industries that are subject to greater risk aversion, in particular
through greater regulatory pressure, higher bankruptcy costs and higher corporate taxes.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that in a risk management setting, vertical integration reduces retail prices.
It exhibits properties that linear instruments such as forward contracts cannot achieve. It
reduces the asymmetric risk structure between upstream and downstream segments. We
have shown a number of mechanisms through which some level of integration is beneﬁcial
even in the presence of wholesale markets.
A next step would be to examine the possibility of large agents and market power.
Allaz (1992) has pointed out that forward trading may reduce producers’ market power.
In contrast, vertical integration sometimes extends market power (Bolton and Whinston
(1993), Chemla (2003), Rey and Tirole (2006)). It would be interesting to study the
resulting eﬀect when these two mechanisms coexist. Future developments in the ﬁeld of
market equilibria should include those elements into the risk management analysis. Our
analysis could then serve as a benchmark to quantify the eﬀects of imperfect competition.
Another avenue for future research may be to examine the decision of whether or not
trading activities and operating activities should be under the same corporate roof. Such
analysis would likely combine issues related to trading and arbitrage with transactions
costs, e.g. ﬁnancial constraints, as in Gromb and Vayanos (2004), with questions such as
those discussed in this paper.
33A Appendix A: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Maximizing the mean-variance criteria over αk yields the following ﬁrst order condition
for agent k ∈ R:


















k = 1 gives the condition on p∗:
0 = E[(p∗ − w∗)D] − 2ΛRVar[(p∗ − w∗)D] − 2ΛRCov[(p∗ − w∗)D,Π
g
I] ,
and allows us to derive (3.3).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Assume that some retailers are risk neutral, so that the aggregate risk aversion coeﬃcient
ΛR also tends to zero. Suppose equation (3.3) has two non-negative solutions p− ≤ p+.
The Taylor expansion of these roots around ΛR = 0 reads:























This shows that p− tends to p0 as ΛR tends to 0, while p+ tends to inﬁnity. Hence, p− is
the economically relevant root, and the equilibrium is in fact uniquely characterized.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
We denote by p∗
NI the smallest solution to (3.3) in the absence of vertical integration,
and by p∗
I this solution when at least one producer is integrated with a retailer. Suppose
34that R ∩ P = ∅, i.e. there is no integrated producer who have both generation and retail
activities. Equation (3.3) then reduces to:
0 = E[(p∗
NI − w∗)D] − 2ΛRVar[(p∗
NI − w∗)D] . (A.1)
As a consequence, it is also greater than the expected spot price.
When some agents are integrated, i.e. R ∩ P 6= ∅, the equation that determines the
retail price is
0 = E[(p∗
I − w∗)D] − 2ΛRCov[(p∗
I − w∗)D,(p∗
I − w∗)D + Π
g
I] .
Suppose that one retailer, say i, chooses to vertically integrate with one producer. Then,





Since Πr and Π
g
I are negatively correlated,
0 ≥ E[(p∗
I − w∗)D] − 2ΛRVar[(p∗
I − w∗)D] . (A.2)
Inequality (A.2), combined with (A.1), shows that p∗
I is lower than p∗
NI. Integrated
ﬁrms then tend to decrease the retail price.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.1






















where M is the variance-covariance matrix of vector [w∗,(p∗ − w∗)D]. By inverting the
system, we obtain f∗
k and α∗
k in terms of p∗ and q∗. If k / ∈ R, Πk does not depend on αk
and the ﬁrst order condition reads:









































































































































k = w∗D−C(D), we obtain equation (4.3). Using this result to simplify (A.3),
we derive the desired (4.4). Finally, from these two equations, we can re-arrange for f∗
k
and α∗
k to obtain (4.1) and (4.2).
36A.5 Equations for the retail price under elastic demand





















































































in the absence of a forward market, and by:
0 = (p∗)2
￿














































































in the presence of a forward market.
B Appendix B: Elastic Demand Curve
If demand is elastic to spot price, our results are unchanged because the spot market equi-
librium remains independent of retail and forward equilibria.21 As mentioned in Remark
??, the model can also be solved with a demand curve that is elastic to the retail price.
Suppose that the demand is a random function of retail price D(p). We can solve the
problem as in Sections 3 or 4 and equations (3.2) and (4.1)-(4.2)-(4.3) remain valid. The
21This may not be true under imperfect competition.
37only diﬀerence lies in the equation for p∗. In the presence of elasticity to retail prices, this
equation becomes
0 = E[(p∗ − w∗(p∗))D(p∗)]
− 2ΛRCov[(p∗ − w∗(p∗))D(p∗),(p∗ − w∗(p∗))D(p∗) + Π
g
I(p∗)]
in the absence of a forward market, and
















with a forward market. This non-linear equation may be hard to solve, especially if we
cannot formulate the spot market equilibrium. Nevertheless, the equation simpliﬁes in
some cases, as we show in the following subsection.
B.0.1 Quadratic cost functions
Consider quadratic and symmetric cost functions ck(x) = c
2x2 , ∀k ∈ K. Suppose that
demand is a linear function of the retail price:
D(p) = D0 − µ(p − p0) ,
where D0 is an exogenous random variable, p0 is some non-negative reference price and
µ > 0. Then the spot market equilibrium can be written:
S∗
k = 1
















where NP is the number of producers and NI the number of integrated ﬁrms. The retail
price p∗ is then given by the smallest root of a second order polynomial equation (cf.
Appendix A).
B.0.2 Examples
To illustrate the eﬀect of demand elasticity, we compute the equilibrium found above in
two cases: one downstream ﬁrm and one upstream ﬁrm, as we did in paragraph 5.2.2, and
38one downstream ﬁrm and one integrated ﬁrm, as in paragraph 5.2.1. We use the demand
samples in the previous section. Taking expectations on both sides of w∗ in (B.1), we




' NP × 5.6143 10−4 .
We set p0 = E[w] ' 37.95 as the expected spot price, and we write the elasticity coeﬃcient
µ in percentage of expected demand E[D].
• Downstream ﬁrm and upstream ﬁrm. Denote the upstream ﬁrm as Agent
1 and the downstream ﬁrm as Agent 2. We set both risk aversion coeﬃcients to
λ1 = λ2 = 10−6. Figure B.16-right shows the retail price with and without a
forward market, as a function of µ, in percentage of E[D]. Again, the presence of

















































Figure B.16: Expected demand (left) and retail price (right) with and without a forward
market as a function of µ.
a forward market decreases the retail price. Nonetheless, this eﬀect tends to shrink
as demand elasticity increases. We also note that, in both cases, demand elasticity
decreases the retail price. As consumers respond to the retail price, the retailers face
low demand if they set a high retail price. They are thus led to decrease the retail
price. Figure B.17 shows Agent 1’s utility with and without a forward market. This
utility increases in the presence of a forward market and the upstream ﬁrm’s utility
decreases with demand elasticity. The asymmetry that enables upstream ﬁrms to
set the spot price and thus to aﬀect downstream ﬁrms’ proﬁt, while downstream
ﬁrms cannot aﬀect upstream ﬁrms’ proﬁt. is reduced when demand is elastic to
retail price, as downstream ﬁrms aﬀect upstream ﬁrms’ proﬁt via the retail price.











































Figure B.17: Agent 1’s utility with (right) and without (left) a forward market as a
function of µ.
Since the expected demand decreases with demand elasticity (see Figure B.16-left),
so does the producers’ utility. In addition, while the relationship between Agent









































Figure B.18: Agent 2’s utility with (right) and without (left) a forward market as a
function of µ.
2’s utility and demand elasticity is negative when there is no forward market, it is
positive in the presence of a forward market (Figure B.18). When there is no forward
market, the downstream ﬁrm is aﬀected by the decrease in both demand and the
retail price. With a forward contract, the downstream ﬁrm can transfer more risk to
the upstream ﬁrm and take advantage of demand elasticity. In particular the gain
in Agent 2’s utility due to the forward market increases with demand elasticity, as
we suggested in Subsection 5.2.2.
• Upstream ﬁrm and integrated ﬁrm. Let Agent 1 be an integrated ﬁrm and
Agent 2 be a downstream ﬁrm. The risk aversion coeﬃcients to both agents are
40set to λ1 = λ2 = 10−6. Figure B.19-right shows Agent 1’s market share with and















































Figure B.19: Expected demand (left) and Agent 1’s market share (right) with and without
a forward market as a function of µ.
without a forward market. As in Subsection 5.2.1, the downstream ﬁrm cannot
compete with the integrated retailer in the absence of a forward market. In this
example, both agents have the same risk aversion coeﬃcient. Agent 2 cannot enter
the market and it has a market share almost equal to zero. The forward market
enables Agent 2 to obtain a market share of 25%. In addition, market shares and
the beneﬁt of integration are not aﬀected by demand elasticity.


























Figure B.20: Retail price as a function of µ.
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